JSCP Nuclear Supplement

The nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is top secret. Few have even seen the table of contents...until now (download from right-hand column).

The JSCP Place In Bush Administration Nuclear Guidance

note: this chronology has been moved to here.

According to STRATCOM, the JSCP-N "defines the threat to be countered, provides the projected threat environment, and levies requirements on the planning product of the SWPS (i.e., the SIOP). It also discusses Theater Nuclear Option (TNO) requirements as well as other requirements so directed by the NCA. Based on current direction, it is becoming increasingly important to provide a full range of military response options to any potential military threat." As can be seen from the table of contents, the type of options discussed include Major Attach Options (MAO), Limited Attack Options (LAO), and Theater Nuclear Options (TNO).

In addition to the OPLANs (Operational Plans), the 1996 JSCP-N directed that combatant CINCs and STRATCOM should "maintain the capability to plan and execute theater nuclear options for generated nuclear forces on short notice during crisis and contingency situations." When planning Theater Nuclear Options (TNOs), the warfighters were directed to consider the following:

1. Explicit objectives;
2. Type of facility, and relation, if any, to enemy power projection capability;
3. Probability of success;
4. Alternative means to achieve the objective, if any;
5. [classified];
6. Estimated fatalities (prompt and fallout);
7. Size of the attack;
8. Type of delivery system;
9. [classified];
10. [classified];
11. [classified];
12. Probable perception of US will and resolve;
13. Likelihood and acceptability of probable enemy response on the US or its allies;
14. [classified];
15. Adequacy of attack as a demonstration of US capability;
16. Relationship to other US military presence;
17. Relationship to US vital interests, treaty commitments, diplomatic agreements, and denial and escalation implications; and
18. [classified].

The document also discusses Adaptive Planning, the post-Cold War war planning methodology used against relocatable and emerging targets not covered by the deliberate plans. At the time of the 1996 JSCP-N, Adaptive Planning was mainly applied to Theater Nuclear Planning and the Nuclear Reserve Force. Yet the 1996 JSCP-N states that Adaptive Planning "will be a principle means of Reserve force employment," but that it "can occur in the pre-, trans-, or post-MAO timeframe and involve either SIOP/NSNF or Reserve forces."

Since then, Adaptive Planning has been incorporated more generally into nuclear planning as the number of MAOs have been reduced and new capabilities have increased the flexibility of the planning system and deployed forces. In February 2005, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard B. Myers stated:

"STRATCOM has revised our strategic deterrence and response plan that became effective in the fall of 2004. This revised, detailed plan provides more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies."

At the time of the 1996 JSCP-N, Russia was clearly the center of U.S. nuclear planning:

"The fundamental objective of US nuclear employment policy is to deter direct attack, particularly nuclear attack, on the United States and its allies. Deterrence is best achieved if [the] US defense posture makes a Russian assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous that it removes any incentive for initiating attack."

With the Bush administration claiming to have removed Russia as an immediate contingency from U.S. nuclear planning, one would assume that "Russia" has been replaced with "adversary" in the 2004 version of JSCP-N. But the planned force level of up to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads in 2012 suggests that Russia remains the predominant focus.

The requirement to maintain forces on high alert, ready to launch on short notice, was a core feature of the U.S. nuclear posture in 1996, and continues to be so today. In the 1996 JSCP-N, however, the guidance defined that "the United States does not rely on its capability for launch on warning or launch under attack to ensure the credibility of its deterrent." Yet the pledge was dubious and apparently did not prevent launch on warning and launch under attack capabilities from being integral characteristics of the strike plans: "At the same time," the 1996 JSCP-N conditioned, "the US ability to carry out such options complicates Russian assessments of war outcomes and enhances deterrence."

The 1996 JSCP-N applied to plans effective on or after October 1, 1996, which included the SIOP-97 strategic war plan that entered into effect the same day. According to STRATCOM, "SIOP-97 was the first effort at making a combined evaluation of the objectives to predict effectiveness of the strike plan. Planners attempted to consider all possible objective (quantifiable) and subjective (non-quantifiable) criteria in assessing each directive."

The declassified Nuclear Supplement was classified Lieutenant General Wesley K. Clark, who in February 1996 was the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff (J-5), and the staff officer responsible for world-wide politico-military affairs and U.S. military strategic planning.

Updates to the Plan

Several changes were made to the basic JSCP and its supplements between 1996 and 2000 when a new plan was published on January 28. This period also saw the publication of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60 in November 1997 and a new Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) in 1999.

The first JSCP of the Bush administration was issued on October 1, 2002, following a new NUWEP issued by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on April 19, 2004. The most recent (as of June 2005) update to JSCP-N was published on December 31, 2004 (CJCSI 3110.04B), followed by Change 1 on March 18, 2005 (see here for recent guidance chronology).

Compared with the 1996 version, the 2004 JSCP-N apparently no longer uses the term "selective release," according to STRATCOM. Before that, the JSCP-N described situations where a combatant commander might request permission from the National Command Authority (NCA) for the selective release of nuclear weapons. But this concept has been omitted because the concept was determined to carry multiple definitions and might confuse planners.

Bureaucratic Secrecy

The declassification process of 1996 JSCP-N revealed serious but common errors in the implementation of the FOIA. First, the redacted sections in the released document closely follow the classification markings in the printed document. The FOIA officer simply deleted everything marked "S" (Secret) and "TS" (Top Secret) and released the sections marked "U" (Unclassified). While this may seem natural to most people, a FOIA declassification officer is can not simply follow existing markings of a document for release determination but is required to make an individual assessment of whether the information is currently and properly classified. But this was not done.

Second, all redacted sections were withheld in full, rather than withholding only those portions of each section that need to be withheld. Few paragraphs are ever fully secrets but contain a few secrets intertwined with unclassified information. By withholding each section in full, the FOIA officer failed to demonstrate what is known as discretionary disclosure requiring release of those segregable portions in each sections that are not currently and properly classified. Yet FOIA officers frequently block-delete because it takes less time than discretionary disclosure.

Because of these errors, and because the denial letter did not determine that there were no segregable portions that could be released, an appeal was made to obtain the additional information and complete the declassification in accordance with the law. But the Pentagon denied the appeal, saying everything was properly and currently classified.

Finally, a follow-up request was submitted in November 2000 for a later version of the Nuclear Supplement. But this request was denied in full in September 2002, withholding even those sections that had previously been declassified in the 1999 release. After a brief moment in partial sun, the JSCP-N is back in the dark.