SAG Study: Essentials of
Post-Cold War Deterrence Among the work of STRATCOM during the 1990s was an effort to adapt nuclear deterrence to address regional proliferators armed with weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, the deterrent was almost entirely focused on the Soviet Union and China, and regional aggressors were only addressed in the context of their alliance with one or those two principle opponents. The expansion of nuclear doctrine after the Cold War to deter not only nuclear but also chemical and biological weapons in the hands of "rogue" states, prompted the various CINCSTRATs to ask SAG to examine the role of deterrence against regional proliferators. In 1993, then CINCSTRAT General Butler asked the SAG Policy Subcommittee to examine what constitutes a credible threat/deterrent to a regional power. Specifically, General Butler asked the subcommittee to examine "how best develop credible linkage between conventional force posture and an 'in'credible Presidential threat of nuclear weapons use (i.e., credible escalation control)." At the SAG meeting at Offutt AFB in October 1993, Policy Subcommittee chairman Ambassador Paul Robinson from Sandia National Laboratories presented a preliminary briefing that summarized the work: what is the purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons; and what size should the U.S. stockpile be to support these purposes. Robinson stated that the role of nuclear weapons continues to evolve, and emphasized the importance of civilian oversight in policy determination, the changing nature of deterrence, and the need to match weapon properties to deterrence aims. He concluded that a careful combination of all factors is required to prevent self-deterrence and discourage proliferation of WMD. The work slowed down during the 1993-1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which the subcommittee was asked to monitor, but the new CINCSTRAT Admiral Henry Chiles noted at the October 1994 SAG meeting that the NPR "validated the concept of deterrence and the importance of the TRIAD." Furthermore, which was important for the subcommittees work, the NPR also "reaffirmed the benefits of ambiguity in existing nuclear weapon declaratory policy." The deterrence work continued and in April 1995 -- the same month the U.S. pledged at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review and extension conference in New York that it would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear NPT countries, Ambassador Robinson presented the subcommittee's newly developed "deterrence theory for use with countries, other than the Former Soviet Union (FSU), who possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)." Although the 1994 NPR was said to have reduced the role of nuclear weapons, Robinson described how the in-depth review of deterrence had been conducted to provide a Terms of Reference that could be used by the other subcommittees as a baseline "to expand the concept of Deterrence of the Use of WMD." Key findings of Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence (download copy in right-hand bar) were as follows:
Several SAG members suggested that the theoretical discussion be carried a step further and applied to "an actual nation-state that is culturally diverse from our American culture, such as Iran, Iraq or North Korea." Six years later the same three countries were labeled "the axis of evil" by the incoming Bush administration and all three appear prominently in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) completed in 2001. Linking deterrence to regional WMD contingencies would have real implications for the size of the nuclear stockpile, and in tandem with the deterrence study the Policy Committee conducted a review of the reasons -- pro and con -- for going below 3,500 (accountable) nuclear weapons. The cons were many: deterrence, hedging, gain leverage, provide an umbrella, discourage arms races (particularly with countries such as China), "deterrence plus providing a broader base to address WMD," defense threshold, targeting needs, common mode failure and dismantlement costs. The minutes from the meeting do not mention any reasons in favor of going below 3,500 warheads. As the U.S. government pledged at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to work toward the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals, the Policy Subcommittee of CINCSTRAT's Strategic Advisory Group instead seemed to conclude that the essentials of deterrence in the post Cold War era with the need to hold Russian nuclear targets at risk, keep China at bay, and engage regional proliferators, all converged into a requirement to continue to maintain a large nuclear stockpile. Admiral Chiles said he was pleased with the work. ©
Hans M. Kristensen |
www.nukestrat.com | 2004 |