SAG Study: Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence
U.S. Strategic Command |
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Among the work of STRATCOM during the 1990s
was an effort to adapt nuclear deterrence to address regional proliferators
armed with weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, the deterrent was almost entirely focused on the Soviet Union and China, and regional aggressors
were only addressed in the context of their alliance with one or those two
principle opponents.
The expansion of nuclear doctrine after the
Cold War to deter not only nuclear but also chemical and biological weapons in
the hands of "rogue" states, prompted the various CINCSTRATs to ask SAG to
examine the role of deterrence against regional proliferators.
In 1993, then CINCSTRAT General Butler asked the
SAG Policy Subcommittee to examine what constitutes a credible threat/deterrent
to a regional power. Specifically, General Butler asked the subcommittee to examine "how
best develop credible linkage between conventional force posture and an
'in'credible Presidential threat of nuclear weapons use (i.e., credible
escalation control)."
At the SAG meeting at Offutt AFB in October
1993, Policy Subcommittee chairman Ambassador Paul Robinson from Sandia National
Laboratories presented a preliminary briefing that summarized the work: what is
the purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons; and what size should the U.S. stockpile be
to support these purposes. Robinson stated that the role of nuclear weapons
continues to evolve, and emphasized the importance of civilian oversight in
policy determination, the changing nature of deterrence, and the need to match
weapon properties to deterrence aims. He concluded that a careful combination of
all factors is required to prevent self-deterrence and discourage proliferation
of WMD.
The work slowed down during the 1993-1994
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which the subcommittee was asked to monitor, but
the new CINCSTRAT Admiral Henry Chiles noted at the October 1994 SAG meeting
that the NPR "validated the concept of deterrence and the importance of the
TRIAD." Furthermore, which was important for the subcommittees work, the NPR
also "reaffirmed the benefits of ambiguity in existing nuclear weapon
declaratory policy."
The deterrence work continued and in April 1995 -- the same month the
U.S. pledged at the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review and extension
conference in New York that it would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear NPT countries, Ambassador Robinson presented the subcommittee's
newly developed "deterrence theory for use with countries, other than the Former
Soviet Union (FSU), who possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)." Although the
1994 NPR was said to have reduced the role of nuclear weapons, Robinson
described how the in-depth review of deterrence had been conducted to provide a
Terms of Reference that could be used by the other subcommittees as a baseline
"to expand the concept of Deterrence of the Use of WMD." Key findings of
Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence (download copy in right-hand bar) were as
follows:
- Deterrence is an active and dynamic
process that must affect the "emotions" as well as the rational mind of the
adversary and must remain flexible enough to change as the leadership (on
either side) changes.
- The deterrence process begins by first
considering the value of U.S. interests that are, or may be threatened, and
by communicating, specifically, what we want to deter without saying what is
permitted.
- Understanding in advance what an adversary
values and U.S. response options to address these values are critical.
- We must be ambiguous about details of our
response if what we value is threatened, but at the same time it must be
clear that our actions would have terrible consequences for them.
- Without a perceived national will and
actual capability, none of the above steps will work.
Several SAG members suggested that the
theoretical discussion be carried a step further and applied to "an actual
nation-state that is culturally diverse from our American culture, such as Iran,
Iraq or North Korea." Six years later the same three countries were labeled
"the axis of evil" by the incoming Bush administration and all three appear
prominently in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) completed in 2001.
Linking deterrence to regional WMD
contingencies would have real implications for the size of the nuclear
stockpile, and in tandem with the deterrence study the Policy Committee
conducted a review of the reasons -- pro and con -- for going below 3,500
(accountable) nuclear weapons. The cons were many: deterrence, hedging, gain
leverage, provide an umbrella, discourage arms races (particularly with
countries such as China), "deterrence plus providing a broader base to address
WMD," defense threshold, targeting needs, common mode failure and dismantlement
costs. The minutes from the meeting do not mention any reasons in favor of going
below 3,500 warheads.
As the U.S. government pledged at the NPT
Review and Extension Conference to work toward the total elimination of its
nuclear arsenals, the Policy Subcommittee of CINCSTRAT's Strategic Advisory
Group instead seemed to conclude that the essentials of deterrence in the post
Cold War era with the need to hold Russian nuclear targets at risk, keep China
at bay, and engage regional proliferators, all converged into a requirement to
continue to maintain a large nuclear stockpile. Admiral Chiles said he was
pleased with the work.
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